Understanding Colombian realities under the spectrum of its bilateral relationship with the United States as well as the current administration’s institutional perspective.

A personal concept document produced for the US- Colombia Task Force,

 created at the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center at the Atlantic Council.

Luis Guillermo Echeverri Vélez

Colombian attorney at law (Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana), agricultural economist form Cornell University, IT, finance and trade specialist, farmer, horse breather and trainer, with more than 35 years of international experience.

Foto de Fernanda Fierro - Unsplash

I.      (Part One)

1. Context on national or regional conflicts of interest for the U.S. and Colombia.

1.1 Introduction. Since the end the colonial era, the principles of liberty and democracy have defined and given identity to the Colombian – US relationship. Both nations have been constantly building a historically respectful, important, productive, culturally compatible and sincere common-ground for their working agenda. It is no coincidence that both nations have the most deeply ingrained traditions of democracy and democratic values across in the American hemisphere. For good and bad, many opportunities have developed during multiple decades of constant and prosperous trading, investment, international diplomatic work and joint efforts against illegal and illicit activities and organizations.

Colombian citizens have embraced American culture; fashion, music, film, production factors and products. For many years, US consumers have identified Colombia by its quality coffee, cultural diversity, natural resources, and by the rapid acculturation of many Colombian migrants that have successfully pursued the American Dream.

However, our mutual benefits have also suffered in the shadow of shared destructive factors, mostly those associated with terrorism and illegal drugs, worsened by a worldwide increasing demand and supply of cocaine, heroin and marijuana.

The effects of coca, cannabis and poppy cultivation, drug production and traffic, distribution, sales and consummation, produces: loss of innocent life’s, a new way of human slavery, all source of abuses to peasant families, epidemic domestic violence, constant terrorists attacks to civilian populations at small villages, urban bombing, child kidnaping and child sexual abuse, murdering of military and police force members´,  deforestation of tropical rainforests and dry forest, oil pipes´ attacks causing spills and permanent environmental damages, incremental drug addiction of young population with permanent health effects, narco-terrorism finance, corruption, illegal arms and chemical trade, counter band, money laundering an economic market and monetary distortions, local and national political instability.

Nonetheless, Colombia society in general is comprised of hardworking good people that live under the rule of law, and Colombian authorities diligently and constantly fight against drugs and all related crimes; all the above, leads us to the being seen as the only origin of international traffic of narcotics, money laundering, illegal capital formations, a damage to societal health, family and youth development, and deterioration of institutions, morality and work ethics.

After living for 26 years in the US, working to raise a family and educate my children, I am confident when I say that if the US, wants to observe and study a country, that will allow it to understand and confront many of its own problems, there will be no better case than understanding Colombia´s realities. We share common problems that are more notorious in a smaller society and less detectable in a large developed and more orderly country.

1.2. Subject Matter considerations: In this first part, I will address my views corresponding to each of the goals stated, as the main objective in this independent policy support effort.

1.2.1. Observations and recommendations shall be forth featuring and independent of electoral considerations.

As stated by Congressional Research Service  Building institutional capacity in all governmental and regulatory aspects, is a critical consideration for leveling the field and adding sustainability, particularly to the market stability of the lesser developed nation within a bilateral relationship. Though, any advisory effort at this point in time, must consider both Colombian and US political election cycles and changes in governmental policy.

Hence, recommendations to improve bilateral relationship cannot ignore, and has to account for the fact that, there are substantial and critical differences between the Santos and the Duque administration, as well as the Obama and Trump administrations. These include, but are not limited to, terms of respecting constitutional and legal framework in concordance to international law and human rights. As well as policy approach towards: National and citizen security, domestic economic priorities, finance and investment policy standards, judicial, local legality considerations and business development aspects.

The Santos´ administration dedicated its eight years in Office to excessive media spending and bribery, spreading propaganda and promotion of a misleading peace agreement with the narco-terrorist group FARC-EP, (the largest illegal organization producer of cocaine in the world according to InSight Crime), with the purpose of signing an agreement for vanity and recognition without considering the costs to Colombia.

On the contrary, Duque´s government under the simple proposition of: (Legality + entrepreneurship = More Equality), is working tirelessly to construct and better future by restoring the rule of law, respect for the constitution and to ensure that Colombia never allows impunity for those who commit crimes against humanity.

1.3. Colombia and the United States can reach consensus on critical issues affecting the region today

Considering the strength and strong historical background of the Colombian – US., relationship, in order to reach such a space, the working group first shall agree upon the most critical aspects affecting the region now days.

1.3.1. -Drugs – A matter of conscious co-responsibility for both governments and all elements of societies . Cultivation, production, traffic, distribution, sales, consumption, corruption of youth and terrorism, corruption and crime associated with it, is no longer someone else´s problem.

1.3.2. -Narcoterrorism associated with populism and communist ideology and propaganda. A particularly damaging factor affecting economic development, market expansion and quality of living across the region .

1.3.3. -Rule of Law. Absence of effective operational judicial system and lack of coherence, a constant effort to improve rule of law. Judicial system improvement, exchange and coordination of judicial authorities is absolutely necessary. Without a safe level field investment will not provide legal alternatives and opportunities.

1.3.4. -Citizen safety and security. We have an increasing rate of crimes related to domestic violence due to cultural deficits and drug related activities. Domestic violence and violence against women has increased, at the primary perpetrator is a partner or ex-partner. In consequence, this is affecting children as well. This is also a shared problem with the US.

1.3.5. -Lack of Infrastructure Investment. Both physical and digital connectivity are essential elements that Colombia needs in order for its market and production capacity to improve. Electricity, water management, sewage and transportation etc., face difficulties in Colombia’s Andean/Tropical geography, (roads and railroads, ports, airports, pipelines, energy storage, are essential elements and lacking milestones for market expansion).

1.3.6. -Bridging the Educational deficit. This factor may be the most important gap that must be addressed before any bilateral relationship can grow. We must work to increase the offer of quality bilingual education at all levels.

1.3.7. -Drug demand, consumption and addiction. Micro-trafficking and drug addiction, are common problems that are still affecting Colombian and US societies.

1.3.8. -Combating corruption, money laundering and contraband. Corruption at institutional and societal levels is both a cultural as well the drug trade influenced issue. It is a constant war waged by those who need and benefit from weak institutions .

Note: Bilateral trade has historically focused on exports and imports of goods and service and has neglected that there are fundamentals like education, infrastructure and equivalence in law and justice practices.

1.4 The Venezuelan Crisis must be addressed as an international issue that needs urgent action

1.4.1. Humanitarian Crisis. Today´s humanitarian crisis of Venezuela has no precedent in the hemisphere, Colombia faces the worst humanitarian crisis in the Americas. It requires further attention and may very well necessitate border intervention with assistance from the UN and/or other security forces .

1.4.2. Narco-terrorism, Populism and Communism. Narco-terrorism combined with communist populism and anti-American sentiment, inflamed by Cuban influence, created the Bolivarian revolutionary movement. Better known as “Castro-Chavismo”, it has grown into a serious threat, affecting liberty, human rights and democracy in the entire region. The case of Venezuela is a critical issue affecting the entire region and it demands a permanent bilateral body that can explore and implement possible solutions.

1.4.3. The Cuban Influence. It is critical for this task to understand that for several years both Venezuela and Cuba have propped up their weak economies through income from drug trafficking, illegal mining of gold, platinum, coltan , and money laundering and contraband that comes from the Chávez and Maduro regimes with FARC-EP, EPL and ELN as supplying a steady stream of cocaine . Therefore, the Venezuela regime and the so called “Cartel de los Soles” (Venezuela´s generals involved in drug trafficking)  constantly interact with a host of criminal and terrorist organizations from around the world, including ISIS, Hezbollah, the Mexican cartels, Central American Maras, Italian, Russian, Spanish, Brazilian and other mafias involved in international narcotics trafficking.

Therefore, both nations must take advantage of the others experience in dealing with these critical issues that not only affect our nation but many others across the globe. We must work together to find new methodological, technological and tactical ways of combating organized crime across our regional borders.

1.5. Colombia’s post-peace process era and the consequences of such agreement

1.5.1. Was the Cuban agreement really about peace? This “peace deal”, inexplicably supported by the Obama administration, began with a heavy media campaign and presidential speeches recognizing the existence of an “armed conflict” in Colombia, and that the nation has been for 50 years in a state of “war”. As opposed to the true definition, which is that we are beset by illegal terrorism organizations that started as political guerrillas in the 40´s and 50´s.

These groups which later evolved into narco-terrorists organizations that combine drug trafficking with extreme violence to preserve their existence. Their status is preserved by financing their costly operations by dominating the largest cocaine production worldwide, importing illegal arms , forming illegal capitals abroad  that manage their money laundering operations and corrupting authorities where ever possible.

The deal with the heads of FARC-EP did not take place in Colombia under supervision by Colombian law, nor on a neutral territory that complied with international law. It was purposely conducted in a communist country that has been under sixty years of dictatorship and it was guaranteed by Venezuela, another country under a totalitarian regime. As well as a Nordic nation that had clear political relations with the heads of FARC-EP and their international advisors.

1.5.2. There are not quasi-democracies. You either are a democracy or not. In terms of international criminal legislation, democracy and “domestic armed conflict” are philosophically opposed concepts. War is not an applicable concept inside a democratic state, where systematic violence and criminal activities represent a violation of the law and by no means a “right that can be given by the government” to members of armed illegal criminal organizations. The recognition of conflict, and a status of belligerence applies to actors within failed states where there is a clear absence of a democratically elected government or those that are under the rule of totalitarian dictatorships.

Accepting the “status of belligerency” of FARC-EP, that is, denominating all criminal activity by narco-terrorist groups, as “conflict and war” as opposed to terrorist activity, created a misleading environment during the negotiation process in Cuba. This led to giving the heads of FARC-EP a “status of belligerency”, a position from which they claimed the “right to rebellion” against the state of Colombia. Furthermore, it brought to life the theory of “crime connectivity” which only promotes impunity. Meaning that all crimes against humanity committed by these terrorist organizations are validated by their supposed “right to rebellion” and will not be judged as humans’ rights violation .

1.5.3. Softening and undermining international legal consensus against Terrorism? The deal and process agreed in Cuba, sadly supported by representatives of the Obama administration, and inspired by well-known communist promoters like Enrique Santiago Romero  and Alvaro Leyva  worked to promote a new school of thought. This new concept, where terrorism is not only excused by governments but terror groups are emboldened by the realization that they will not need to pay for their most heinous crimes.

When analyzing the Colombian “peace process”, we must address the fact that several fundamental elements where deliberately left out from the negotiations in Cuba, as well as the creation of a transitional process rife with impunity.

Those fundamental elements not included are:

1.5.3.1 Drug production and trafficking. The agreements did not seriously address coca and drug production, narco-trafficking and other criminal activities associated to the drug trade. By leaving these critical elements out of the dialogues, FARC-EP was able to multiply its production by 5 and expand their business world-wide. In fact, the production of coca passed from 40,000 hectares in 2010 to 200,000+ hectares, bringing with it various primary and secondary effects for the country.

1.5.3.2 Total, full stop on fumigation of coca fields. Among the key conditions that FARC-EP imposed in Cuba under the surveillance of USG representatives, was to forbid by judicial ruling and legislation the aerial fumigation of coca fields.

1.5.3.3. Urban and rural “support” militias. The agreement left out the inclusion of the hidden part of FARC-EP called “Milesians”, which are not rank, uniformed and file FARC members. They are composed of those that support the FARC in urban cells, as well rural populations, including some indigenous, black and farmers associations.

1.5.3.4. Colombian Communist Party structure. The deal never spoke of nor included the active urban domestic and international component of FARC-EP known as the PC3.

1.5.3.5. Their international business promotion and operations structures for:

a). Representation in front of foreign governments and NGO’s.

b). Drug trafficking contacts and operational field agents.

c). Money laundering and transfer structure.

d). Their international suppliers of arms, ammunition, equipment and chemical dealers/suppliers.

1.5.4. The wicked deceit to the people´s democratic will.  In 2016 the Santos´ administration decided to hold a referendum to have the Colombian people vote on its peace deal. Consisting of 313 pages, 14 minor concessions by the FARC-EP, and a massive amount of promises, many far beyond possible, from the Colombian government. The referendum was called due to the concern from the Santos administration that they would not be able to approve the deal in parliament due to strong opposition. Growing concern from the population about the peace deal lead to further anxiety that even a popular vote would reject the deal. Then, they changed the referendum to a plebiscite, and later still unsure of their victory, they changed the rules to add ridiculously low minimums, much of this was achieved through favor and bribery, especially for congressmen and media outlets.

In October 1 of 2016 the Colombian people went to the polls and the majority voted NO to the implementation of the agreement. The Colombian people exercised their democratic freedom and legally the agreement with FARC-EP was no more. Unhappy with the result and the will of the voters, and even after a generous offer to revisit the agreement while changing articles related to crimes against humanity by the NO vote supporters (Uribe, Duque and others), the Santos administration moved quickly. They unilaterally decided to bring the agreement to congress and used all their available tactics, resources, and political capital, to make congress and the courts questionably validate the popularly rejected agreements via the so called “Fast-Track”, producing a new constitutional reform .

1.6. How cooperation efforts should be channeled in the following years?

1.6.1. Education and Infrastructure. Cooperation efforts shall focus on long term financing for investment in infrastructure and education, two great needs that relate to employment and quality of labor, factors that are absolutely necessary in any further Colombian and Andean market expansion for US., goods and services. Once those two components, judicial stability and the rule of law improves Colombia’s outlook, this trade relationship can only grow.

1.6.2. Strengthening Colombia´s leading regional political and security role.

1.6.2.1. Co-responsibility.  As stated by U.S. officials and President Duque, co-responsibility shall be a fundamental principle for further improving bilateral relations. There is no better partner regarding all aspects of security in Latin America than Colombia. Not only because of geographical location but also due to the quality and capability of our security forces, many of which have been trained by US military advisors, already displaying the benefits of cooperation. Therefore, the challenge regarding this matter is how to further improve cooperation towards an efficient tactical, logistical and informational support in the fight to maintain democracy and fighting drug trafficking. Using the existing template of military and intelligence cooperation, we can work to fortify in the legal and judicial procedures to which will secure the position of our armed forces and institutions in their fight against terrorism and organized crime. This is a matter that by no means can be abandoned nor neglected, we must work to continually improve this relationship.

1.6.2.2. The principal of egalitarian law. All aid, finance and joint ventures that can be used for economic development shall be reoriented from “FARC-EP-Santos peace deal” supporting programs, into those that focus on the new administration's efforts to restore the concept of “Legality”, where all citizens must be equal under the law. Legality is explained by President Duque as the junction of Security and Justice for all. It is the first step the country must take to then focus on supporting Entrepreneurship and development spurring economic growth and job creation. All this with the goal guarantee social improvements in pursuit of a more Equitable society. The goal is a Colombia where all are equal in the eyes of the law, where any citizen can work to success, and where all can benefit from the country we have built together.

II. (Part Two)

2. Economic Investment & Opportunities Ahead

Historically the US. – Colombia trade and investment relationship presents a constant progress and improvement pattern. . Critical areas other than the necessary milestones of increasing investment in education and infrastructure are:

2.1. Responsible legal Mining. Colombia has a rich history of mining. It started as a mining society and will likely return to it, due to the fact that the early mountain formations left the country with large and diverse minerals reserve. Yet, an undiscovered potential for mineral extraction.

President Duque´s proposals regarding extractive industries focus on: -Producing by conserving and conserving by producing. Responsible mining and extraction is a must in Colombia, when, how and who will do it, is yet to be determinate. The sad reality is that during the previous administration, licensing for extraction was suspended, a short-sighted decision that had severe economic effects on the mining sector and multiplied illegal mining . (Another source of illegal income for narco-terrorist groups controlling rural areas).

2.2. Better promotion of the (CTPA) Agreement´s opportunities.  When a bilateral free trade agreement becomes effective, advantages mostly lie for the side that is more prepared for export, has the proper means to finance those exports, and that truly has the capacity to meet increasing demands. While, the other country shall update its regulatory framework, its logistics, customs systems etc., so that trade flows do not find new, hidden, or natural trade barriers. This should be the case of the US., regarding Colombia. However, my personal opinion is that both nations have been under promoting the agreement and have not made the best of it. Together we should be able to work to show private actors in both countries the massive potential of this agreement .

I believe both the United States’ Government and Colombia’s Government and their promotional institutions are not doing enough in identifying manufacturing, assembling and investment opportunities to take full advantage of the agreement. It seems that 7 years later the negotiating spirits have not been replaced by a cooperative win-win ideology. International trade agreements with the USA, work to their full capacity when they receive full supported in Washington D.C. by U.S. states that make them their own priority business matter. Colombia/US., trade agreement was not presented by Florida (our main trading partner in the union) but to our own diplomatic and public relations. Thus, negotiations took longer than expected and we need to recover from it.

2.3. Improvement of International Regulatory, Economic development performance Standards. Despite its condition of middle-income country Colombia is constantly working in upgrading and leveling regulatory standards and policy making best practices. Some of these efforts are represented by:

Entering the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Improving in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report.

Improving rules and incentives for developing efficient capital markets.

Improving regulatory frameworks and systems for transparency and consistency.

Strong constant commitment to regional economic integration and political cooperation.

2.4 Current Economic Challenges

All the reference information provided enlist the most critical challenges that must be addressed in order to continue building a strong bilateral relationship. Informal business and illegal industries, intellectual property, legal stability, predictable and expeditious justice, physical security, trade dumping, smuggling, money laundry, corruption, etc., etc. All these hurdles can be overcome provided the determination and political will of both head of states and the coordinated efforts of all supporting official and private organizations, finance instances and associations involved in the Colombian-US., political and economic relationship.

2.5 Current Security Challenges

2.5.1. The Colombian people´s democratic mandate.  Again, the task force shall consider that, while the Duque administration has committed to define which parameters are legally and economically feasible to implement among the FARC-EP deal with the Santos administration; the Colombian´s people democratic mandate form October 2016 was purposely ignored by the previous government. It shall also consider that the procedures by which the agreement was transformed into constructional and legal reform, have been disputed and questioned by many Colombians, including the current president during his entire political career, and the great majority of the Colombian voters.

2.5.2. Narcoterrorism and Politics. It is very questionable, whether or not in FARC-EP was truly dismantled as a criminal narco-terrorist organization, and whether its representatives in congress are supported by illegal money, by its hidden and never reported militia, by the structures that were left in place after the peace process. Nor is it clear if members are still active in terrorism, drug trafficking another illegal activity, in consort with its international structures and by their ties with the Cuban and Venezuela regimes. ELN and EPL are still among the most destructive narco-terrorist organizations in the world killing innocent people and creating one of the largest environmental criminal disasters ever.

2.5.3. Most illegal activities are related to drug production, Narcotrafficking and illegal mining. There is illegal presence and activities of the ELN, the Bacrims (Bandas Criminales), and other criminal organizations in many areas of the country where they control territory and fight over the conquest of new areas. The presence of armed FARC dissidents continues. Rising homicide rates among social leaders have very different causes. A dramatic increase in coca production boost insecurity. The Venezuela humanitarian crisis, and many other issues add to the problem.

Although these challenges affect many parts of the country, they are especially critical in territories most affected by violence form illegal activities. In many of these areas, the basic pillars of a social contract between the population and the state are lacking. To correct social inequalities and institutional deficits, which are widely considered root causes of the wrongly named “armed conflict”, significant reforms are needed. The country must work to ensure more transparent and capable local governance, strengthen the rule of law and the judicial system, protect human rights, expand economic opportunities especially for young men and women, formalize property rights, collect taxes, and invest in infrastructure and social services. In addition, stabilization of territories most affected by narcoterrorism and crime, requires successfully reintegrating ex-combatants and preventing—or confronting—the presence and activities of non-state armed actors. Protecting vulnerable groups from recruitment into criminal syndicates and dismantling illicit economies is also essential for more sustainable coexistence in these territories.

2.5.4. Peace but without impunity. President Duque remains committed to lead Colombia on a true path to peace, but without impunity. However, he has been critical of certain components of the 2016 Peace Accord and has shifted the government’s strategy. This includes, but is not limited to, the Duque administration’s 2019 budget cut of around $140 million in funding for development projects proposed in the original agreement, which includes reduced funds for institutions such as the Rural Development Agency and the Territorial Renovation Agency (Agencia de Renovación del Territorio – ART).

At the same time, the administration announced a 53 percent increase in defense spending. Amid these proposed cuts, it is estimated that, over the next 15 years, the cost of implementing the country’s peace agreement with the FARC could amount to approximately $40 billion. For FY2018, the US Congress appropriated over $384 million in foreign aid for Colombia, including assistance to promote peace and end the conflict. For FY2019, the President’s budget requested $265 million, a decrease of approximately $118 million. For FY2020, the same amount has been requested, $265 million, although with a slight difference in breakdown.

In order of prioritization by amount, the funds will be going to: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement, Economic Support and Development Fund, Foreign Military Finance, Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs, and International Military Education and Training.

President Duque has thus far taken a hard-liner approach to issues of security both domestically and abroad. He suspended talks with the ELN after the organization claimed responsibility for a deadly bombing at a police cadet school. Additionally, he pushed back on the Supreme Court and Congress through his opposition of the Court’s prohibition on aerial fumigation of coca crops. He also objected six articles of the statutory law for Special Jurisdiction for Peace.

President Duque is steadfast in his commitment to contain the growth of illicit crops, reduce drug consumption and supply, and positively transform the territories most affected by drug trafficking. In the past seven months, he has expanded mobile eradication groups from 23 to 100, allocating over $319,000 of the national budget for their operation.

2.5.5. Criminal and Narco-terrorist activities, not an Armed Conflict. Again, we cannot work under the premises that all our problems are linked to the concept of an “armed conflict”. We simply do not endorse such a concept. Colombia is a democracy run by a legitimate, popularly elected government. Colombia is a republic with solid institutions and not a territory where two tribes fight for power, or a nation under the oppression of a dictatorship.

2.5.6. Democratic tradition and democratic values identity. The differences in size and wealth, does not preclude our nations from not sharing the same problems, inequality, poverty, drugs, crime, etc. Colombia and the US are two nations that share the same democratic values. The same type of democratic and republican institutions, separation of powers within the state, a bicameral congress, a judicial system, patriotic armed forces committed to preserving democracy, law and order, and social pacts based on solid constitutional principles.

2.5.7. The rule of law does not mix with impunity. The document as presented by the Atlantic Council has not once mentioned the word “Impunity”.

President Duque won with the promise of building a better future for all and that can only happen if all individuals are treated equally under the law. Colombia as a constitutional republic cannot allow crimes against humanity to be tried in a system created to create impunity. It is not the path to peace, it will only lead to further conflict.

I invite this group to carefully review President Duque´s views on this critical subject and the essence of the objections to the JEP (Special Justice for Peace or transitional justice mechanism, derived from the Cuban agreements that were not endorsed by the people´s vote).

2.5.8. The importance of constant support from the USG in the fight against Crime, Drugs and terrorism. What we need is not only consulting and training. We know how to fight narcotics and terrorism. Our armed forces know how to combat these issues and have the will to do so. They can teach the world on the subject matter; thanks to their experience and the experience they’ve gained through cooperation with the US. We do need land and river equipment, supplies, air capabilities suited to jungle warfare.  We need allies as we face the crisis in Venezuela.

What we need today, is logistical and tactical equipment for our operational and intelligence groups to continue fighting against organized crime. We need qualified satellite information. Their business has multiplied during the peace accord process, now we need to multiply our tools and our capacity to act against organized narco-terrorism.

What we need is further cooperation under a mutually accepted co-responsibility, information to fight narcotics groups, information on how illegal arms, chemicals, supplies and money flow and return to Colombia, and where money from narcotics is kept in foreign accounts.

2.6. Discussion Questions & Answers. (Q & A)

2.6.1. State capacity in rural areas.

Q: How can the state grow stronger and more legitimate in places where it has traditionally been weak? There are several pending reforms, such as strengthening justice institutions, creating an effective tax system, formalizing land property rights, and ensuring the safety of local communities. How can the country embark on a long-term project of state building?

A: Rule of law and judicial fairness for the private sector to expand are part of the solution. Agricultural extension and formation of cooperative systems without political influence or involvement, are viable options. Presence of the state in all municipalities with security is key. Institutions and extension of services. Teaching municipal authorities how to manage budgets and projects, and not fall into corruption.

In the Andes of Colombia, every 100 meters of altitude and 100 kilometers of road, you will find a different microclimate and different soil conditions. In the north and eastern plains, the problem is the half year, rainy/dry seasons. The answer is not creating more bureaucracy, not bringing more international consultancy, no more theoretical approaches that do not apply to the tropics. We need doers that do not stop progress.

2.6.2. Economic development.

Q: Strengthening state institutions is necessary for economic development. Yet, historically marginalized communities also need infrastructure and “tailor-made” economic plans that take into account the particular characteristics of each region. How can Colombia strengthen infrastructure along the supply chain to foster rural development and create economic opportunities in these regions?

A: Again, the answer as far as improvement of our bilateral relations is concerned, is to invest heavily in infrastructure, rural roads improvement, water and sewerage systems, esterification, ports, gas pipelines, securing oil pipelines, and bringing connectivity to all the corners of the country. high speed connectivity, data centers, IT developments for efficiency and transparency, ASP systems, etc.

2.6.3. Local governance, trust and inclusion.

Q: Improving local governance, not only by the state but also by non-state actors, such as ethnic authorities, and bolstering trust between the state and communities are integral components in the establishment of lasting and sustainable peace in Colombia. Good governance and public trust result not only from effective institutions but also from increased accountability, transparency and a vibrant participatory democracy. What institutional systems need to be reformed to generate trust and create better access to opportunities for those who have been disenfranchised? How can the state work together with local communities to improve local governance and the quality of local democracy?

A: The goal is sustainable social and economic development. Let’s not allow that to take a back seat to the simple concept of “peace”. Peace is a noble ideal that we all have to work for but it only occurs when the society has achieved a certain level of development. Peace in Colombia is not an attainable goal as long as drug production and other related activities have been controlled, economic development is the only way to substitute a culture that centers around drugs.

2.6.4. Safety of local leaders and communities.

Q: Ensuring lasting peace in Colombia requires protecting vulnerable populations in the provinces most impacted by violence. Despite extensive military presence, challenges remain in addressing the safety of social leaders and rural communities as violence and targeted killings have continued. President Duque has expressed a need for stronger intelligence capabilities to help meet his goal of protecting vulnerable provinces from criminal actors. In what constructive ways can the US assist Colombia in bolstering intelligence capabilities? What other measures can the government take to protect vulnerable social leaders and local communities, while including them in the decision-making process, and how can the US help in these efforts?

A: Again, the Colombian administration believes in peace, but one without impunity. Again, the document starts with the objective of “ensuring lasting peace” as the frame for discussion. This statement belongs to the Santos administration´s narrative and is not what this government has been mandated to do by the Colombian people. The Santos administration disregarded the importance of intelligence gathering in support of police and military operations in secluded regions of the country as well as in cities.

The government is working hard to improve non-violent coexistence under the rule of law, with the right balance between citizen’s security and justice. Precisely what president Duque defines as Legality. President Duque is committed to improving social and economic conditions by providing safety and the rule of law.

All things considered, Duque administration does more for protection, safety and security of social leaders than any other government in the region. Obedience to the law is a pillar of what President Duque is attempting to make instill in Colombia’ society. Like everywhere there are good local leaders and local leaders involved in corruption, crime, drug production and narco-trafficking or micro-trafficking. Good social leaders become a problem for all criminal organizations and for bad social leaders. Thus, there are many reasons why this horrendous problem has persisted.

2.6.5. Non-state armed groups.

Q: The stabilization of territories formerly in conflict requires comprehensive efforts to undermine the power and activities of non-state armed groups. Such armed groups thrive in areas facing the institutional, political, and economic challenges discussed above. In addition, the presence of illicit economies enables them to grow stronger and penetrate deeply into local communities. What interventions can reduce the influence and power of these organizations, as well as deter the recruitment of young, vulnerable populations? In what ways can the US help Colombia achieve these goals?

A: We do not agree with the term “Non-state Armed Groups”.  These are criminal organizations related to drug production, narco-traffic and crimes against peasant families, the civilian population, the environment etc. Giving them the status of non-state armed groups is a political narco-communist strategy that it is not admissible for a report of this quality addressing the two nations with the oldest sovereign democratic tradition in our hemisphere.

Colombia is a constitutional democracy of equalitarian law. I do not agree with the Non-state armed groups denomination. Those above described are simply various narco-terrorist groups, in reality they are no different than organized crime groups.

We believe in the concept of stabilization as reverting matters to the concept of a having a nation of equalitarian rule of law, as opposed to the concept of conflict and post-conflict, where law abiding citizens do not enjoy the same legal status as criminals.

We do not agree with the denomination of “territories formerly in conflict” those are legally owned private lands.

It is not because of the presence of illicit economies, that organized crime and corruption grow stronger, it is because all organized crime groups in rural and urban Colombia are fully dedicated to drug traffic.

2.6.6. Coca.

Q: Colombia and the United States are committed to reducing coca production by 50 percent by 2023.27 Traditionally, both countries have been proponents of aerial spraying, with the US producing the glyphosate that has been used in the past to eliminate coca crops. Given the Colombian Constitutional Court ruling prohibiting aerial spraying—which has been challenged by President Duque but remains the law as of now—how could both countries work together on a long-term plan to reduce coca? Between August 2018 and February 2019, the Duque administration has eradicated 40,000 hectares of illicit crops, reaching the highest monthly rate of eradication since the start of manual eradication. Given that coca growers re-planted approximately 36 percent of the area uprooted through forced eradication in 2018,28 how can both countries work to create economic opportunities for former coca-producing communities so that they don’t fall prey to illicit activities?

A: (Answers)

2.6.6.1. The subject matter shall not just be coca planting. All the following issues shall be address as fundamental components of a comprehensive bilateral, strict, long term and well-founded new policy against drugs (Cocaine, heroin and cannabis) and all drug related crimes affecting families, communities, individuals, children, young people, and society:

2.6.6.2. Social sanction and prevention.

Recognition of drugs as a major problem affecting social development everywhere.

Recognition of co-responsibility by the both governments in all matters related to drugs.

Supply will be condemned as criminal and demand will not be  accepted as recreational.

The policy shall be homogeneously implemented across borders, centrally coordinated.

Adolescent anti-drug and addictions education is a must in both nations.

Social media will play a big role showing damages of drug use to people and the environment

Cocaine “de-branding” campaign showing the real damage it creates. TV & video.

2.6.6.3. Suggested Combined actions.

Strengthen the judicial and police enforcement capacities in both countries

Special judicial systems if necessary

Reinforce the intelligence community and activities for tracking and seizures

More severe drug money and asset control policies.

Creation of a bilateral fund for sustainability of the policy.

Control of coca production:

            Air and land fumigations with chemicals

            Air and land fumigation with natural herbicides

            R&D to have biological control (Worms, fungus, other pests)

            Manual eradication

            Forest ranger’s programs

            Reforestation programs

            Alternative economic activities that attract labor

Control Chemical exports, imports, trackability mechanisms.

Control of cocaine productions at the origin as well as other drugs.

Control of cookers, chemical engineers, and technicians producing drugs.

Control of arms, munitions, explosive and other weapons

Control of contraband and money laundering related to drugs

Specialized satellite monitoring and information in regards to the entire supply chain.

Take down and destruction of airplanes, boats and vehicles transporting drugs.

Information about transportation and controls in access roads, ports, and borders.

Improvement of border and road controls in both countries.

Improve inland drugs transportation interdictions.

Create an international task-force capable of interdiction.

Intelligence cooperation to follow money trails.

National border patrol and international waters and airspace control

2.6.7. Reintegration.

Q: Reducing uncertainty for former FARC members and ensuring their reintegration into society is essential to prevent them from joining criminal organizations and creating new security threats. How can the government work to improve the prospects for reintegration, and how can the US support these processes?

A: Since the Uribe administration Colombia has a well-established, and open, reintegration policy.  One that applies to all regular militants of criminal narco-terrorist organizations, paramilitaries and communist oriented groups, that freely choose to surrender their arms and re-enter society. This is the reintegration policy that the US should support, because it has been proven to work and the current government is implementing it.

Regular militants of narco-terrorist organizations in Colombia have often been forcibly recruited as children and adolescents. Kidnaped by FARC-EP, ELN, EPL and Paramilitaries, from small farming families and villages, some of them were sold by the leaders of their own communities, sexually and physically abused, turned into criminals at the service of the leaders of those criminal organizations. The opportunity for reintegration will remain open and continue but impunity for the leaders of the criminal organizations will not be allowed. It is those that suffered from this horrendous narco-slavery that should be reintegrated, not their victimizers.  

This document appears to only concentrates on the failed peace deal of Santos that only refers to FARC-EP. The group should review the facts and numbers associated with the reintegration during the Uribe administration and compare to those of today. Account for the origins of today militants in all illegal organizations, and the effect of the presence of foreign illegal organizations in Colombia.

2.6.8. Venezuela.

Q: Restoration of democracy in Venezuela is a moral imperative, but it is also a sound investment in regional security. The Colombian government estimates that the cost of providing emergency healthcare, education, vaccinations, and other services to Venezuelan refugees could exceed 0.5 percent of the country’s GDP. Beyond humanitarian aid, which is integral but insufficient, in what ways can the US burden share with its strongest regional ally to help mitigate challenges associated with the influx of Venezuelan migrants and refugees and prevent spillover security threats spurred by the Venezuelan crisis?

A: Today the country is full of international consulting and international organizations deriving income form theoretical consulting work about the failed peace agreement. Meanwhile, we are lacking in our response to the largest humanitarian crisis ever experienced in the history of our region.

Efforts shall be driven both to humanitarian aid and to help the people of Venezuela to find most practical and least expensive way to end their suffering and destruction by the Maduro regime and its allies.

Cuba started a revolution against a corrupt military regime that had a relationship with narcotrafficking and other illicit activities. Ironically. It ended-up becoming a corrupt military dictatorship dealing with drug trafficking and spreading revolutionary ideas in other nations. Cuba has a direct, and terrible influence on the Venezuela crisis. The Cuban regime is deriving income form Venezuela’s misery. Many of the regional political problems and most certainly Venezuela could end, if Cuba’s destabilizing influence is properly addressed. It is essential for the return of democracy in Venezuela. With this, a path of improving social and economic development, rebuilding the middle class, reviving incomes and markets as well as savings many innocent human lives, can begin.

2.6.9. Global and regional role.

Q: Colombia has developed innovative security technologies to navigate its diverse terrain in combating illegal actors. For example, Colombian engineers designed the PAF – “Patrullera de Apoyo Fluvial”, a versatile military boat used for combat in Colombia’s rivers. Brazil, Guatemala and the United State, among others, purchased these boats to enhance their own security. Colombia has also expanded its security cooperation in Central America, the Caribbean, Afghanistan, NATO and UN Peacekeeping Operations, and has achieved impressive democratic reforms and implemented effective anti-corruption measures. How can we build on Colombia’s role as a regional security leader and on its progress in the strengthening of democracy, anti-corruption, and human rights? What is the potential for greater leadership in addressing issues in other parts of the region?

A: The answer to the questions is, by recognizing the value of having President Duque as true champion for democracy and democratic values across the region. Trusting his ideas, his work and his capacity to execute and inspire the region away from totalitarian communists and drug trafficking related regimes is critical for progress across the Americas.

In just a few months Duque has proved his leadership qualities that shall be recognized by the work of this group. Colombia has the opportunity to retake the development and progress path that we had. Numbers do not lie and the experiment of a peace deal that was exclusive and negotiated under the watch of two dictatorship regimes served as a bridge for impunity, production of more drugs, more crimes and more human right violations. We have the obligation to preserve liberty and democracy, not by winning awards, but by ensuring justice and the rule of law are central for the regions development path. Legal, equitable fair trade, and investment among our nations will be the shared policy goal.

If Venezuela and Cuba are properly dealt with and a strong drug policy is placed with a long-term commitment, the prosperity of the entire hemisphere can be equal to what is being seen in Asia. The GOC and the USG shall continue to play a key role at the UN and the UN´s Security council as well as with the group of Lima and its extended international support to make sure Venezuela can begin to recover from this crisis.

Restoring Venezuela to democracy and to its production and market capacity is essential for our hemisphere to grow healthier in a difficult global environment where trading blocks appear in this new wave of globalization.

2.6.10. Trade.

Q: In 2016, Colombia was the 26th largest trading partner of the US, with $26.9 billion in total goods trade (two way). Major US imports from Colombia include crude oil ($7.7 billion), gold ($1.4 billion), coffee, tea and spices ($1.3 billion) and cut flowers ($720 million).7 How can both countries work to both strengthen and diversify trade?

A: The US business community has not yet been fully aware of the manufacturing transformation and service opportunities that Colombia offers due to its geographic location, quality of labor and the superb work ethic of its business community. Alternatives to good and services in Asia, can be addressed and promoted bilaterally across business communities across the United States. Investment opportunities in infrastructure and education are critical to strengthening the factors needed to truly develop a stronger bilateral economic relationship.

We need a new approach to enhance business development and trade promotion. A combined investment and market driven approach. The US commercial and trade promotion towards Colombian has been consumer product-oriented, neglecting the important of infrastructure and education in the short term in order to truly have a significant consumer goods market growth in the future. Colombia needs to be better understood at the level and work should be done on how to approach different markets. Creative economy, IT driven business, new technology applied to production of goods, services and extraction of natural resources are the essential components of the “emprendimiento” component of President Duque´s National Development plan.

2.6.11. Investment.

Q: US FDI in Colombia totaled $7.2 billion in 2017. In the same year, Colombian FDI in the US totaled $2.6 billion, supporting 5,500 US jobs.8 What measures can both governments take to incentivize investment from the other country’s public and private sectors? In Colombia, what guidelines should be established to meet environmental standards, benefit communities in underdeveloped regions, and ensure good return on investment? How can we expand the orange economy and creative industries to better meet the demands of the 21st century?

A: My simple answer to the above questions is, by investing heavily in infrastructure, both physical and digital and even more heavily un education; the rest, will evolve naturally.

2.6.12. Gold.

Q: According to the United Nations, 66 percent of Colombia’s gold is mined illegally, generating $2.4 billion losses in economic profits, violence, and environmental and health damages. In what ways can the US and Colombia work to formalize this sector of the economy, while protecting the environment and local communities?

A: The former government halted the issuing of mining licenses. Legal and responsible mining encountered severe issues during this period. Illegal mining unfortunately was an enforcement priority and experienced growth in the face of a weakened formal sector. Duque is committed to allowing the mining sector to operate, but with the understanding that mining must be performed in a responsible manner. Working together with the sector will create an environment where legal miners strive to run responsible operations. (“Producir Conservando y Conservar Produciendo”)

2.6.13. Formalization.

Q: President Duque’s 2018-2022 National Development Plan has a strong focus on economic formalization, given that 49 percent of Colombia’s workforce operates in the informal market.11 How can Colombia better incentivize formality and create more formalized jobs? How can innovation, science and technology be leveraged to include more people in the labor market?

A: Formalization of business requires first organization and optimization allowing them to function effectively and primitively.  Therefore, aid is need to better help business bilingualism, math, English subtitles in T.V., more engineering and technical specialized programs, etc., With this we can create a labor force able to maintain and improve their knowledge and business culture.

2.6.14. Reforms.

Q: One of President Duque’s first initiatives was a tax reform.12 He also recently launched a new initiative to curb corruption.13 What other reforms are needed to overcome key challenges for doing business in Colombia? Similarly, President Trump adjusted the tax brackets in the US to incentivize entrepreneurship and investment. What additional measures can the US take to expand market access for Colombians doing business in the US?

A: The initiative was not exactly a plain tax reform. It is a four years plan with a set of macroeconomic reforms for economic recovery, due to the fact that the financial state of the country was more severe than the administration had expected. Duque received a country with a great deal of financial deficit and unsustainable debt levels. Market and multilateral financial responses were positive and confidence is slowly but surely restoring GDP growth.

Final Note: Critical points that need quick actions are improvement of customs IT systems that allow the country to have price references and a digital real time. Control systems at port of entry and at critical points in Colombian roads, airports and ports. Better management of property taken by the authorities form criminal and illegal organizations. Put in place all possible mechanisms to place a full stop on the recurrent terrorists’ attacks to the oil pipelines, which by the way is the main source of environmental destruction.

Colombia has to create further investment incentives and strengthen security issues from the physical citizens safety to the judicial security for domestic and FDI. Fiscal discipline and shortening the inherited excessive government expending, are part of an overall set of macroeconomic corrections that already proved to work as to generate and enhance economic confidence levels.

END.

LGEV (May/13/2019)